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Abstract 
This article argues that the international financial consequences of immigration exert a 
strong influence on the choice of exchange rate regimes in the developing world. Over 
the past two decades, migrant remittances have emerged as a significant source of 
external finance for developing countries, often exceeding conventional sources of capital 
such as foreign direct investment and bank lending.  Remittances are unlike nearly all 
other capital flows in that they are stable and move countercyclically relative to the 
recipient country’s economy. As a result, they mitigate the costs of forgone domestic 
monetary policy autonomy and also serve as the “risk-sharing” mechanism required by 
standard political economy models of currency unions. The observable implication of 
these arguments is that remittances increase the likelihood that policymakers adopt  fixed 
exchange rates.  An analysis of data on de facto exchange rate regimes and a newly 
available dataset on remittances for up to 74 developing countries from 1983 to 2004 
provides strong support for these arguments; the results are robust to instrumental 
variable analysis and the inclusion of multiple economic and political control variables.  
 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the second annual International 
Political Economy Society conference at Stanford University, and at the Duke University 
Seminar on Globalization and Governance.    2
Over the past two decades, migrant remittances have emerged as a significant 
source of external finance for developing countries.  Remittances—which arise when 
migrants send money back home to their families—are an important lifeline for some of 
the poorest countries in the world, but also constitute a sizable share of GDP for 
emerging-market countries.  In countries such as El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and 
Jordan, inflows of remittances exceed 15 percent of GDP. In 2004, a total of 34 
developing countries had remittances inflows greater than 5 percent of GDP.  The World 
Bank estimates that total recorded flows of remittances reached $167 billion in 2005; this 
is a staggering sum that dwarfs other financial sources, such as official development 
assistance, bank lending, and private investment. Annual flows of remittances even 
exceed foreign direct investment (FDI) for the majority of developing countries.
1  
The rise of remittances challenges our understanding of the influence of global 
finance on national policy choices in the developing world.  Indeed, the contrast between 
remittances and other capital flows is remarkable.  Most sources of external finance, 
including international bank lending, sovereign bond investment, and FDI, are highly 
procyclical in their reaction to the state of the receiving economy. For example, bank 
lending will dry up if a country experiences a financial crisis, thereby exacerbating the 
subsequent economic contraction. Similarly, bond investors will withdraw their funds 
from countries experiencing high inflation and fiscal difficulties, while FDI will decline 
in reaction to a downturn in economic growth (Mosley 2000, 2003; Jensen 2006; Li and 
Resnick 2003).  Scholars have these procyclical capital flows in mind when they argue 
that financial globalization generates insecurity and income volatility for domestic 
businesses and individual citizens (e.g., Garrett 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2004).  On 
                                                 
1 All data from World Bank 2006 based on observations from 2004 unless otherwise noted.    3
the other hand, remittances are “unrequited”: they do not result in claims on assets, debt 
service obligations, or other contractual obligations (Brown 2006; Kapur 2005). In 
contrast to purchases of financial or productive assets, which can be liquidated and 
repatriated, remittances cannot be withdrawn from a country ex post.  Moreover, migrants 
tend to increase their remittances when their countries of origin experience economic 
downturns. As a result, remittances smooth the incomes of families and shield 
policymakers from the vagaries of the global economy.  In short, financial transfers from 
migrants are a form of insurance for developing countries against exogenous shocks 
(Kapur 2005; Lopez-Cordova and Olmedo 2005; Lucas and Stark 1985; Rapoport and 
Docquier 2005; Yang and Choi 2007).   
What are the implications for national policymaking when cross-border financial 
transfers within families emerge as a prominent force in the global economy? The rise of 
remittances has potentially profound implications for a variety of national policy choices. 
This article focuses on exchange rate policy, which is arguably the most important 
macroeconomic policy domain for governments in developing countries (Cooper 1999).  
Indeed, the exchange rate is the most important price in an open economy, as it affects 
the price of all other goods and services. More importantly, the choice of exchange rate 
regime—whether fixed, floating, or somewhere in between—has important ramifications 
for inflation, private investment, trading relationships, currency crises, and economic 
growth. Past scholarship has considered financial openness (broadly construed) as a 
constraint on exchange rate policy: countries with more open capital accounts are more 
likely to float their currencies, because a fixed exchange rate precludes the use of the 
domestic interest rate as an economic adjustment mechanism (Bernhard and Leblang   4
1999; Cohen 1993; Leblang 1999; Broz 2002).  However, the assumption that capital 
flows are uniformly constraining on national policymaking is not compelling for 
developing countries that are heavily dependent on remittances. This article argues that 
remittances mitigate the costs of lost monetary policy autonomy because they react 
countercyclically to economic downturns and otherwise insulate policymakers from the 
ups and downs of the economic cycle. In essence, remittances have the capacity to 
substitute (albeit imperfectly) for domestic monetary policy autonomy in the developing 
world. Therefore, I expect inflows of remittances to be positively associated with the 
implementation of fixed exchange rates.  I develop this argument using conventional 
macroeconomic models in unconventional ways. Using Robert Mundell’s (1961) 
optimum currency area framework, I argue that migrant remittances serve a similar 
function as centralized fiscal transfers (or other supraregional risk-sharing mechanisms) 
in allowing the domestic economy to adjust to a fixed exchange rate.  
The article proceeds as follows.  I begin with an overview of the increasing 
prominence of remittances in the global economy, including a discussion of geographic 
variation in flows to the developing world. I also discuss the causes of remittances—
namely, migration to wealthier countries and technological factors—and their economic 
and political effects on receiving countries.  I pay careful attention to the ample evidence 
of remittances’ countercyclical impact on recipient countries. I then provide an empirical 
test of the hypothesis that remittances are associated with fixed exchange rate regimes in 
the developing world. Using newly available World Bank data on annual remittances 
from 1983-2004 for up to 99 countries, I demonstrate that countries for which remittances 
constitute a substantial share of GDP are more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates.  This   5
finding is of particular significance given the recent ideological shift against fixed rates: 
it appears that remittances encourage policymakers to go against the tide.  Moreover, the 
statistical findings are not driven primarily by the poorest countries; middle-income 
countries also appear to be highly influenced by remittances when setting exchange rate 
policy.  I also account for possible endogeneity by using migrant flows to wealthy 
countries as an instrumental variable for remittances. The article concludes with a 
discussion of the broader implications of remittances for the political economy of 
national policymaking in a global economy.   
 
Remittances: Definitions, Trends, and Consequences 
 
  International financial transfers from migrants to family members in their home 
countries are known as remittances. A typical remittance transaction contains two parts: 
first, the migrant contracts with an agent—either a money service business such as 
Western Union, a bank, or an informal agent—and transmits the money to the agent via 
cash, check, credit card, or other debit instruction; and second, the agent instructs its own 
affiliate in the receiving country to deliver the remittance to the beneficiary (Ratha 
2005a). 
  By all accounts, remittances have experienced tremendous growth over the past 
two decades.  Recorded remittances to developing countries increased from $31.2 billion 
in 1990 to $160 billion in 2004.  The rate of growth was fastest for “lower middle income 
countries” (with approximate GDP per capita between $1,000 and $3,500), a category 
that includes countries such as El Salvador, Indonesia, and Tunisia.  The dramatic growth   6
in remittances is particularly striking in comparison to other capital flows (Figure 1). 
Private debt and portfolio equity investment in developing countries, for example, 
declined by 20 percent between 1995 and 2004, whereas official development assistance 
increased by a modest 34 percent over the same period.  The result of these trends is that 
remittances currently exceed nearly all other external sources of capital flows in the 
developing world. Even in Mexico, which is known for attracting investment from U.S. 
corporations, inflows of remittances have been nearly equal to FDI inflows since 2003. In 
fact, remittances were larger than the total of all public and private capital inflows—
including FDI, foreign aid, and private debt and equity investment—for 36 countries in 
2004.
2  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
  Migrants in the United States remitted nearly $39 billion to their countries of 
origin in 2004, making it the largest source country for remittances (World Bank 2006).  
The other significant source countries include many of the large continental European 
economies (Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy) as well as four Middle Eastern 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kuwait, and Oman) (Kapur 2005). 
  It is a myth that remittances flow only to very poor countries.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, in 2004, France, Spain, and Belgium were among the ten largest recipients 
of remittances.  Among developing countries, more than 70 percent of total remittances 
                                                 
2 World Bank (2006) states (p.88) that remittances currently exceed FDI in Mexico. In 2003 and 2004, total 
FDI as a percentage of GDP was 2.4 percent and 2.8 percent, respectively, whereas remittances were 2.3 
percent and 2.7 percent, respectively.  Other data from World Bank (2006) and World Development 
Indicators (multiple years).    7
accrue to those in the “middle-income” bracket, including China, Honduras, and Peru. 
Nevertheless, for poor countries such as Moldova, Lesotho, and Haiti, remittances 
constitute more than 25 percent of GDP and thus are a critical lifeline for the resident 
population (see Figures 2a and 2b).  
 
Figures 2a and 2b about here 
  
Causes and Consequences 
  Remittances are the international financial consequence of immigration, which 
has been steadily increasing in recent times. The total stock of migrants—estimated at 
175 million in 2000—increases by approximately six million annually, which is 
appreciably faster than the growth of world population (ILO 2004).  Between 1970 and 
2000, the number of migrants in North America increased from 13 million to 41 million, 
or approximately 3.7 percent annually; for Europe, the number of migrants increased 
from 19 million to 33 million over the same period. Approximately 50 percent of all 
migrants are considered economically active—that is, they are gainfully employed in the 
host country—whereas the other half consist of students studying abroad, those 
accompanying economically active family members, and refugees (IOM 2005).   
  Although migration has been steadily increasing, it is certainly not a new 
phenomenon, and it alone cannot explain the rapid increase in the flow of remittances.  
Other factors, such as technological developments in financial infrastructure, have 
reduced the costs of transmitting funds across countries. Money transfer businesses—
especially Western Union—have experienced tremendous growth; there are now more   8
than seven times as many Western Union agents worldwide (over 310,000 locations in 
200 countries) than McDonalds and Starbucks locations combined.
3  Capital account 
liberalization, including the relaxation of restrictions on foreign exchange deposits, has 
no doubt facilitated the international reach of these businesses (IMF 2005). Domestic 
financial institutions have also matured as countries have liberalized capital flows and 
embraced (in varying degrees) the global economy. Banks throughout the developing 
world have adopted modern risk-management techniques and improved their lending 
portfolios, and in the process they have reeled in many more citizens as customers.   
Kapur (2005) notes that banks in developed countries also facilitate the flow of 
remittances by competing with money transfer agents for migrants’ business. Migrants in 
developed and emerging-market countries now have several options for sending money 
back home. The transaction costs of remitting funds will continue to decline as 
developing-country financial infrastructure improves and new transfer agents enter the 
market.  
To understand the consequences of remittances, it is helpful first to understand the 
motivation of remitters. Rapoport and Docquier (2005, 10) note that migration should be 
viewed as “an informal familial arrangement, with benefits in the realms of risk 
diversification, consumption smoothing, and intergenerational financing of investments.” 
This definition captures the altruistic as well as self-interested motivations for 
remittances. Altruism within the context of family relationships is perhaps the most 
obvious motivation: migrant workers wish to support their family members who remain 
behind, and their transfers of funds do not lead to promises of future compensation. 
                                                 
3 Data compiled from corporate websites: www.mcdonalds.com, www.starbucks.com, and 
www.westernunion.com.    9
Indeed, family members use remittances primarily to finance consumption, including 
food, shelter, health care, and basic necessities (Brown 2006; Chami, Fullenkamp, and 
Jahjah 2005; Durrand and Massey 1992; Glytsos 1993). Migrants might also send money 
back home for self-interested reasons, such as to provide for the maintenance or 
expansion of existing investments (businesses, land, etc.) that they left behind, or the 
repayment of loans.  Some scholars have argued that ostensibly self-interested 
motivations can be subsumed under the rubrics of “enlightened selfishness” or “impure 
altruism” because remittances are transmitted between individuals with strong familial 
(i.e., non-financial) ties (Lucas and Stark 1985; Andreoni 1989). It is indeed difficult to 
argue that remittances follow the profit-seeking calculus of other financial flows, as the 
discussion below on countercyclical remittance flows will demonstrate.  
There is a substantial literature on the poverty-reducing impact of remittances, 
which is largely beyond the scope of this article.
4 However, the “multiplier effects” of 
remittances deserve special mention here. Inflows of remittances generally contribute 
more than their initial value to the receiving economy (Orozco 2004; Ratha 2005b).  One 
study of the Mexican economy found that each remitted dollar generates four dollars in 
demand for goods and services (Durrand, Parrado, and Massey 1986).  An important 
implication of the multiplier effect is that households that do not receive remittances still 
benefit from remittances to other households.  For example, construction workers, timber 
producers, and day laborers benefit if remittances are used for home building (Kapur 
2005). Even remittances to rural and remote areas have a broader economic impact, as the 
secondary beneficiaries of these capital inflows include goods and labor markets in urban 
areas (Zarate-Hoyos 2004).   
                                                 
4 See Brown (2006) and Rapoport and Docquier (2005) for surveys of the literature.    10
 
Countercyclical Remittance Inflows 
  Remittances are transfers between families that tend to flow countercyclically 
relative to the recipient country’s economy (World Bank 2006).  Migrants send more 
money to their families when their home countries experience economic downturns, 
financial crises, or natural disasters.  Moreover, adverse circumstances often trigger more 
migration, which then results in greater remittance inflows. As Stuart Brown (2006, 60) 
notes, remittances serve as “transnational intra-family or intra-community safety nets, 
cushioning societies from the disruption attending more volatile financial flows.”  Several 
empirical studies, including Chami et al (2005), IMF (2005), and Kapur (2005), find a 
strong relationship between economic contractions and subsequent increases in 
remittances for developing countries.  Indeed, Kapur (2005) finds that the average share 
of remittances in private consumption for 14 developing countries more than tripled in 
the three years after an economic shock.
5 An IMF study (IMF 2005) reports that countries 
such as Mexico, Indonesia, and Thailand experienced a significant increase in 
remittances in the two years immediately after their respective financial crises in the 
1990s; similarly, Bangladesh, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Honduras experienced 
increases after natural disasters.  The same study reports that home-country output has a 
statistically significant and negative impact on remittances for a panel of 87 countries.  
Among the most compelling studies of the countercyclicality of remittances are 
Yang (2007) and Yang and Choi (2007).  Yang (2007) finds that remittances increase 
substantially in the wake of hurricanes in a panel of more than 70 developing countries 
between 1970 and 2002.  Clarke and Wallsten (2003) find similar results for the 
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responsiveness of remittances to hurricane Gilbert in Jamaica in 1988. Given these 
articles’ focus on natural disasters as the trigger for remittances, there is no concern over 
endogeneity.  Yang and Choi (2007) are also sensitive to endogeneity in examining how 
remittances respond to household income shocks in the Philippines.  Using rainfall 
shocks as an instrumental variable, they find that 60 percent of household income 
contractions are replaced by remittance inflows.  
Whereas most capital flows exacerbate the booms and busts of developing 
economies, remittances are unique in their tendency to mitigate volatility. A large-sample 
study conducted by the IMF found that remittances substantially reduce the volatility of 
output, consumption, and investment (IMF 2005).  On the other hand, in periods of stable 
economic growth, remittances are far less volatile than other capital flows; even foreign 
aid was more volatile than remittances from 1980 to 2003 (IMF 2005).  Moreover, 
notwithstanding current reports of a temporary downturn in remittances from the U.S. to 
Mexico, a recent IMF study demonstrates that remittances to Latin America are relatively 
insensitive to the U.S. business cycle, thereby underlining their role as a stable source of 
external finance (Roache and Gradzke 2007). It is therefore becoming increasingly 
common for scholars to tout the “insurance” function of remittances for the developing 
world (Kapur 2005; Lopez-Cordova and Olmedo 2005; Yang and Choi 2007).  
It is unconventional to assert that capital flows could lead to an increase in 
macroeconomic stability, or that they could counteract rather than exacerbate the 
vicissitudes of the global economy. Indeed, many scholars believe that countries require 
some form of insulation from global financial markets, such as welfare state spending, a 
larger government, or some other form of redistribution (Garrett 1998; Katzenstein 1985;   12
Rodrik 1998; Ruggie 1982; Scheve and Slaughter 2007). If, however, we assume that 
remittances can serve as a form of insulation rather than a source of insecurity, then 
political economy models should differentiate the impact of remittances from more 
conventional financial flows, such as sovereign lending or FDI. This is no more apparent 
than for the study of exchange rate regimes, in which political scientists conventionally 
assume that financial openness is a uniformly constraining force that pushes decision 
makers into an uncomfortable trade-off between international stability and domestic 
autonomy. Given that remittances constitute a substantial share of capital flows to the 
developing world, the theoretical impact of financial openness on exchange rate politics 
should be unpacked and re-examined.   
 
Remittances and Exchange Rates: Mundell-Fleming in the Developing World 
 
  The analytical heart of the literature on the political economy of exchange rates is 
the Mundell-Fleming model and its famous implication that countries must choose to 
forgo one of three policy goals: exchange rate stability, full capital mobility, or domestic 
monetary policy autonomy (Mundell 1960; Fleming 1962). In today’s world of highly 
integrated financial markets, a discrepancy between the domestic and world interest rates 
causes capital to flow in the direction of the higher return. If the exchange rate is allowed 
to float, it will adjust accordingly—appreciating with capital inflows and depreciating 
with capital outflows.  However, if the exchange rate is fixed, then the interest-rate 
differential is quickly arbitraged away by the capital flows. The result is that the 
combination of mobile capital and a fixed exchange rate renders monetary policy   13
ineffective as a policy tool.  The Mundell-Fleming conditions imply a trade-off between 
stability and flexibility (Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002; Frieden and Stein 2001; Bearce 
2007). Stability arises from the fixed exchange rate, which decreases transaction costs for 
investors, traders, and other groups with ties to the global economy, and also leads to 
monetary stability by tying the hands of monetary policymakers.  On the other hand, 
flexibility is associated with floating exchange rates, which provide monetary 
policymakers with the capacity to adjust interest rates to changing domestic economic 
circumstances.  
With this fundamental trade-off between stability and flexibility in mind, scholars 
have employed several analytical approaches to explain governments’ exchange rate 
regime choices.  Frieden and his colleagues, for example, argue that exporters and 
import-competers both value currency depreciation, and therefore oppose a rigidly fixed 
exchange rate, whereas foreign investors and creditors value the stability of a fixed rate 
(Blomberg, Frieden, and Stein 2005; Frieden 2002; Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein 2001). 
Broz takes an institutional approach and argues that fixed exchange rates are more 
common in opaque (i.e., non-democratic) political systems as a means of fighting 
inflation; alternative institutional remedies, such as central bank independence, are 
ineffective without the monitoring and accountability found in democracies.  Other 
scholars examine the relative costs of domestic adjustment to fixed exchange rates, which 
are arguably lower in stable governments and those with small numbers of veto players 
(Edwards 1999; Simmons 1994; Keefer and Stasavage 2002).  In regard to industrial 
democracies, Bernhard and Leblang (1999) argue that governments will float their 
currencies when the exigencies of electoral competition demand the use of domestic   14
interest rate adjustments. And finally, studies such as Clark (2002), Clark and Hallerberg 
(2000), and Hallerberg (2002) examine the trade-off between fiscal and monetary policy 
discretion within the Mundell-Fleming framework, noting that fixed exchange rates 
enhance the power of fiscal policy when capital is fully mobile.  Governments are 
therefore more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates when fiscal policy, rather than 
monetary policy, is the most effective tool for electoral gain, as in OECD multiparty 
coalition states where targeted spending can be rewarded by voters (Hallerberg 2002).    
  The disparate studies discussed above conceive of capital mobility as the 
sensitivity of capital flows to domestic interest rates, in line with the Mundell-Fleming 
model. Scholars generally measure capital mobility as a policy choice: if governments 
impose no restrictions on capital flows, then capital is assumed to be responsive to 
differential rates of return (e.g., Oatley 1999).  In empirical studies of exchange rate 
regimes, an index of financial policy openness from Quinn (1997) or Chinn and Ito 
(2006), or a simple dichotomous variable based on capital controls surveys from the IMF, 
are frequently the only included measures of a country’s relationship with international 
financial markets. The standard argument is that financial closure allows governments to 
reap the benefits of fixed exchange rates without sacrificing domestic monetary policy 
autonomy (Bernhard and Leblang 1999; Leblang 1997, 1999; Broz 2002). Financial 
openness, on the other hand, makes the adoption of fixed exchange rates less attractive 
and therefore less likely.
6  
  The assumption that international capital chases the highest rate of return is 
reasonable for developed countries but questionable for many developing countries.  In 
                                                 
6 In addition, economists argue that the speculative pressures enabled by capital mobility increase the 
difficulty of maintaining fixed rates; see Agenor 2001; Eichengreen 1999; and Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995.   15
developed economies, the dominant forms of capital flows are FDI, private and sovereign 
bond investment, equity investment, and bank lending, all of which are responsive to 
differential rates of return.  However, in developing countries, the international financial 
consequences of immigration must also enter the equation.  Migrant remittances, which 
constitute a substantial share of capital inflows for the majority of developing countries, 
respond primarily to the needs of families rather than interest rates. The times in which 
remittances increase—such as economic downturns—are precisely the times in which 
other capital inflows would normally dry up as investors steer their funds toward more 
profitable venues.  
  Introducing remittances into the political economy model of exchange rates does 
not imply an abandonment of the Mundell-Fleming conditions.  Indeed, mobile capital 
will respond to differential rates of return even in countries that are heavily dependent on 
remittances. However, I argue that such countries will be less concerned about forgoing 
domestic monetary policy autonomy. Consider the impact of an increase in remittances 
during a recession in the receiving country. Households use the funds to bolster their 
consumption of food and basic necessities, and to maintain existing small businesses and 
other investments. Such spending and investment has a multiplier effect on the economy, 
triggering additional investment and consumer spending.  In short, remittances—when 
sufficiently large in relation to the economy— constitute an automatic stabilizer that 
performs a similar function to countercyclical monetary policy. As such, remittances 
stand apart from other capital flows in that they do not exacerbate the trade-off between 
fixed exchange rates and domestic monetary policy autonomy.  In fact, high remittance 
inflows make it less costly for countries to adopt fixed rates.   16
  Although exchange-rate models as applied by political economists are limited by 
their stylized view of capital mobility, Mundell’s optimum currency area (OCA) criteria 
in fact provide a useful, if inadvertent, perspective on the importance of remittances 
(Mundell 1961).  The OCA framework, elaborated by McKinnon (1963) and others, 
argues that countries that choose to share a common currency should respond similarly to 
economic shocks, such as sudden changes in the prices of commodities. The logic is 
straightforward: a single currency implies a single monetary policy. If economic 
conditions vary substantially across different regions of the currency area, a single 
monetary policy will prove woefully inadequate in stabilizing the economy. However, 
because asymmetric shocks are always possible even in the most economically 
homogeneous of currency unions, countries must somehow adjust their own domestic 
economies to fit the prevailing monetary policy. The OCA literature has focused on two 
adjustment mechanisms: first, labor mobility within the union should be high enough to 
allow workers in adversely affected regions to relocate to more favorable employment 
environments; and second, the currency union itself should have a system of “risk 
sharing”—usually defined as fiscal transfers—to respond to local shocks, just as the U.S. 
federal government sends emergency funds to States in times of crisis. The OCA criteria 
are rarely realized in practice, especially for developing countries that anchor their 
currencies to the Euro, the U.S. dollar, or some other developed-country currency. 
Shocks to developed and developing economies are likely to be asymmetric, and labor 
mobility is rarely high enough to be an effective short-term stabilizer.  On the issue of 
risk sharing, however, many developing countries depend on remittances to offset 
economic downturns. Remittances are not “fiscal transfers” per se, as no central   17
government has the power to direct them to countries in need. Yet they do enable 
countries to cede some of the risks of forgone monetary policy autonomy to migrant 
workers, who in turn remit funds to their families in countercyclical fashion.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
The discussion thus far suggests that the flexibility of a country’s exchange rate 
regime will be inversely related to its level of inward remittances. In other words, 
remittance inflows increase the probability that a country will choose to fix its exchange 
rate.  I use time-series cross-sectional data to test this hypothesis. The dataset contains 
annual observations on as many as 99 developing countries during the 1983-2004 time 
period.  The dependent variable is the de facto exchange rate regime, coded as a four-
category ordinal variable based on data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
7  Higher values 
indicate greater degrees of exchange rate flexibility. The categories are as follows: 1 = 
fixed, including traditional peg, currency board, no separate legal tender, and pre-
announced horizontal band of less than +/- 2 percent; 2 = crawling peg or band; 3 = 
managed floating, including crawling bands wider than +/- 2 percent; and 4 = free 
floating.
8  I discard observations classified as “freely falling” and dual markets with 
missing parallel market data. Unlike de jure classifications based on official government 
policy, these de facto measures of exchange rate regimes are derived from a combination 
of foreign reserve activity, parallel market exchange rates, and extensive country 
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8 See Reinhart and Rogoff 2004; further details are available on Reinhart’s website, 
http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/reinhart/readme.txt    18
chronologies (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004). They therefore capture the actual operation of 
the exchange rate regime over time.  
Data on the key explanatory variable, inward remittances as a share of GDP, are 
newly available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (multiple years).
9  
I use these data with a degree of caution. World Bank researchers are able to estimate 
only the officially recorded inward remittances for each country-year, not the flows 
through unofficial channels, such as the hawala system and other informal value transfer 
systems. As discussed earlier, recorded flows have risen dramatically in recent times, and 
a portion of this increase may be attributable to a shift from unofficial to official 
transmission channels, rather than an increase in remittances per se.  The World Bank 
attempts to mitigate this problem by using estimates from its own country desks or from 
national central banks when official balance-of-payments statistics are missing or of 
questionable construction. Nevertheless, unofficial flows remain outside the scope of the 
dataset.  
In the initial specification, I construct a simple baseline model (Model 1) that 
includes GDP (logged), GDP per capita (logged), and the measure of remittances (lagged 
one period). Model 2 includes a fuller complement of macroeconomic and political 
variables. I control for OCA considerations by including trade openness (the share of 
imports plus exports in GDP, lagged one period), given that smaller, more open 
economies are generally more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates. Also included is the 
“KAOPEN” index of capital account openness from Chinn and Ito (2006). It is based on 
the binary coding of restrictions in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions, and focuses on four dimensions of restrictions: the existence 
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of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on the current and capital accounts (where the 
latter are measured as the proportion of the last five years without controls), and 
requirements to surrender export proceeds.
10  The index has a mean of zero and ranges 
from -2.66 (full capital controls) to 2.66 (complete liberalization). Based on prior 
scholarship, capital account openness should be negatively associated with the adoption 
of fixed rates. However, OCA theory suggests that countries with more open capital 
accounts should be more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates, as high levels of financial 
integration can generate strong domestic support for stable cross-border financial 
relationships.  
Model 2 also includes the size of a country’s foreign exchange reserves measured 
in months of exports, with the expectation that a larger stock of foreign currency 
facilitates the maintenance of a fixed rate (e.g., Klein and Marion 1997).  Terms of trade 
volatility captures the susceptibility of an economy to external shocks emanating from 
changes in the price of traded goods. It is measured as the standard deviation of the terms 
of trade index over the prior three years.  Higher volatility is expected to be associated 
with floating rates, as countries require the flexibility to adjust quickly to the external 
shocks (Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein 2001).  Finally, Model 2 includes a measure of 
democracy based on the Polity IV database (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 2006).  The 
variable ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). Following Broz 
(2002), I expect this variable to be positively associated with floating, as transparent 
political systems do not require a transparent anchor for monetary policy. Given the 
ordinal nature of the dependent variable, I estimate the models using ordered probit with 
standard errors clustered on country.  I do not include a lagged dependent variable; 
                                                 
10 For a detailed description of this measure, see Chinn and Ito 2006.     20
however, the result for remittances remains statistically significant in all models with its 
inclusion. Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1.
11 Table 2 presents 
the regression results.  
Table 1 and Table 2 here 
The results from Models 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that inward remittances 
are associated with fixed exchange rate regimes in developing countries. The coefficient 
for remittances is negative and highly statistically significant. (Recall that lower values of 
the dependent variable imply greater degrees of exchange rate fixity.)  Moreover, this 
result is robust to the inclusion of OCA-related macroeconomic variables. The two 
measures of exposure to the international economy, KAOPEN and trade openness, are 
both negative and significant as expected by OCA theory. Note, however, that simpler 
measures of capital controls have been shown to be positively associated with floating 
exchange rates in prior scholarship (e.g., Broz 2002; Leblang 1999). As expected, 
countries with larger holdings of foreign exchange are better able to maintain a fixed rate, 
as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient for reserves. While GDP and GDP 
per capita are significant in Model 1, they lose significance in Model 2.  The coefficient 
for terms of trade volatility is positive as expected, but it is just shy of conventional levels 
of significance.  In addition, the coefficient for Polity is positive and significant, which 
supports the idea that democracies can sustain floating exchange rates by using domestic 
institutions to credibly commit to price stability.  
                                                 
11 I exclude the countries in the CFA Franc zones in Africa, as their inclusion as independent observations 
is questionable in light of the prominent role of French central bank in their monetary affairs. See, e.g., 
Stasavage 1997. Moreover, their inclusion in the sample could bias the results in favor of my argument, as 
they are coded as fixed exchange rate regimes with relatively high levels of remittances.    21
In the third model, I incorporate two additional political variables that may be 
relevant to exchange rate regime choice.  First, political instability may be associated 
with floating if policymakers with short time horizons and precarious political support are 
hesitant to commit to a fixed rate (Edwards 1996; Broz 2002). However, as Edwards 
(1996) notes, political instability could have dueling influences on exchange rate policy.  
Greater instability increases the costs of abandoning a peg and therefore reduces the ex 
ante probability that a peg will be chosen; on the other hand, instability makes decision 
makers less concerned about the costs of reneging on an exchange rate commitment in 
the future.  I use a measure of adverse regime changes from the Political Instability Task 
Force (PITF). The variable “Political Crisis” is the percentage of the prior five years in 
which the country experienced an “adverse shift in the pattern of governance,” including 
a major shift toward authoritarianism, a revolution in the political elite, contested 
dissolution of federal states, or the collapse of central authority (PITF 2001).
12  
Second, I include a measure of political constraints on government decision 
making based on Henisz (2002). The construction of this variable begins by identifying 
the number of effective branches of government—including the executive, the legislative 
body or bodies, the judiciary, and any other sub-national units—with veto power over 
policy change.  The number is modified to reflect whether these veto points are 
controlled by different political parties, and the degree of preference heterogeneity within 
each branch. Higher values represent “stronger,” or less constrained, governments.  I 
therefore expect a negative coefficient for this variable, implying an association between 
strong governments and fixing the exchange rate. 
                                                 
12 The PITF database records the beginning and ending years of the adverse regime change. The variable 
“Political Crisis” can therefore range from 0 to 100 percent, depending on the status of the country in the 
prior five years.    22
The results for Model 3, presented in the third column in Table 2, show that the 
initial finding for the effect of remittances remains negative and significant with the 
inclusion of the additional political variables, neither of which is significant. The other 
results are largely unchanged; however, note that the inclusion of these variables reduces 
the sample size substantially due to limited data availability. 
  Since the substantive interpretation of ordered probit coefficients is not 
straightforward, I provide simulations with estimates from Model 2 in Figure 3.
13  The 
solid line demonstrates how the probability of fixing the exchange rate changes as 
remittances increase while the other variables are held at their means.  The dotted lines 
represent 95 percent confidence intervals.  I limit the range of remittances (the X axis) to 
0 to 20 percent, although a few countries in the sample have remittances in excess of this 
level.
14 When remittances increase by one standard deviation from the sample mean—
i.e., from approximately 4 percent to 14 percent—the probability of fixing the exchange 
rate increases from 18 percent to 39 percent.  
Figure 3 here 
 
Robustness Checks 
There are, of course, a number of additional variables whose inclusion in the 
model could be theoretically justified. Frieden (2002) and Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein 
(2001), for example, place special emphasis on the influence of tradables producers on 
exchange rate politics.  I included a measure of manufacturing production as a percentage 
of GDP, which was found to be of particular significance in Frieden et al (2001), along 
                                                 
13 Simulations conducted using CLARIFY (Tomz et al 2003).   
14 Lesotho receives remittances in excess of 80 percent in certain years; the results are robust to dropping 
Lesotho from the sample.    23
with a similar measure of agricultural production.  Manufacturing was in fact statistically 
significant, although its sign was negative, indicating an association with fixed exchange 
rates. Agricultural production was not statistically significant. A annual measure of the 
percentage of countries in the world under fixed rates—as a means to capture the 
ideological bias in favor of (or against) fixed exchange rates—was also not significant 
(Collins 1996; Frieden et al 2001; Broz 2002).  Finally, foreign aid could condition the 
choice of exchange rate regime if policymakers feel that it is a reliable source of foreign 
exchange, especially in times of economic downturn. To test this hypothesis, I included a 
measure of foreign aid as a percentage of GDP in Model 2. Not surprisingly, it was not 
significant. Foreign aid is not a reliable capital inflow for most countries, and it is 
frequently tied to policy adjustments and other conditions. It is therefore not surprising 
that it does not have the same impact on exchange rate regime choices as remittances.  
To ensure that the baseline results are not unduly biased by the relationship 
between remittances and exchange rate regimes in very poor countries, I reran the model 
excluding all countries classified by the World Bank as “low income.” The truncation 
results in a loss of 269 country-years, but the finding for remittances remains largely 
unchanged.  The impact of remittances is similarly robust to dropping all countries in the 
middle-income category.
15   
Finally, because the ordered probit model is limited in its ability to account for 
cross-country heterogeneity
16, I transformed the dependent variable into a binary measure 
                                                 
15 The World Bank defines “low income” as GNI under $905, and “middle income” as GNI between $906 
and $11,115.  
16 Fixed-effects ordered probit and ordered logit models do not provide consistent estimates.     24
and estimated a logit model with country fixed effects.
17 This conditional logit model 
accounts for unobserved cross-country variation, including inter alia the degree of 
correlation between the economic cycles of the remitting and receiving countries, the 
cultural motivations for remitting, and other time-invariant characteristics of countries.
18 
It should be noted that remittance levels as a share of GDP are relatively slow to change 
over time for many countries, and therefore the fixed effects model provides a 
particularly strenuous test. Nevertheless, results on the variables of interest remain 
substantively unchanged from the ordered probit analysis, although the sample size is 
reduced to 24 countries (383 observations) due to the fixed effects estimator. Results are 
presented in Table 3, Model 4.  
Table 3 here 
Instrumental Variable Analysis 
If migrants take into account exchange-rate instability when deciding whether or 
not to remit, then the models presented above may be biased due to endogeneity. To be 
clear, there is little reason to expect that fixed exchange rates themselves cause a greater 
inflow of remittances as a share of GDP.
19 Nevertheless, to address the possibility of 
endogeneity, I employ an instrumental variable analysis using the five-year rolling 
average annual emigration to 15 advanced industrial countries, scaled by the sending 
country’s population.
20 This variable, labeled “emigration,” is a suitable instrument 
                                                 
17 Country-years higher than 6 on the Reinhart and Rogoff fine scale were coded as 1 (floating), with 14 
and 15 discarded.   
18 On the insensitivity of remittances to the sending country’s business cycle, see Roache and Gradzka 
2007. 
19 It is possible that migrants take into account the level of the exchange rate when deciding when, not 
whether, to remit.  
20 Data from United Nations 2006. I thank Dean Yang and Jessica Hoel for graciously compiling and 
sharing the data. A five-year rolling average was also used in Esteves and Khoudour Casteras 2008. The 15   25
because it is clearly correlated with remittances (one would expect that countries with 
high levels of emigration to wealthy countries would experience high levels of 
remittances), but it satisfies the exclusion restriction—namely that there is no theoretical 
reason for it to be causally related to the country’s exchange rate regime. The analysis 
proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the remittances variable is regressed on the 
instrument and the other control variables in Model 3 (Table 3).
21  The predicted value of 
remittances from the first stage is then included as a regressor in a second-stage probit 
model, using the dichotomous measure of exchange rate regime as the dependent 
variable. This “two stage probit least squares” model has been shown to produce 
consistent estimates (Alvarez and Glasgow 1999). The results of the second stage are 
included as Model 5 in Table 4.  Similar results are obtained by using a linear two-stage 
least squares model using the original ordered (1-4) dependent variable.
22 The coefficient 
on instrumented remittances in all models is negative and statistically significant. 
However, the results should be interpreted with caution, as the instrument is considered 
weak by standard diagnostics.
23  
 
Conclusion 
The rise of remittances has profound implications for the study of international 
financial relations.  As families extend beyond national boundaries through migration, the 
resulting flow of funds is changing the character of financial market influence on 
government policymaking. Indeed, the evolution of financial globalization is taking an 
                                                                                                                                                 
countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.  
21 In the first stage, the instrument is positive and significant at the 99 percent level.  
22 Results obtained using Stata’s xtivreg command with random effects.  
23 The F-statistic on the instrument is approximately 6.0.  Please see Reviewers’ Appendix.    26
interesting turn in the developing world.  While their developed-country counterparts 
react to the increasing integration of asset markets and the spread of the multinational 
corporation, developing countries are also adapting to the international financial 
consequences of immigration. Remittances from overseas migrants constitute a major 
source of capital for the majority of developing countries, and some countries rely almost 
exclusively on remittances for foreign exchange. Unlike nearly all other types of capital 
flows, remittances respond primarily to the needs of families and not the profit-seeking 
motives of investors.  
This article introduced the flow of remittances into the study of the political 
economy of exchange rate regimes and challenged the notion of financial market 
openness as an undifferentiated influence on economic policymaking. Prior scholarship 
views the free movement of capital as a constraint on policymakers that decreases the 
probability of selecting a fixed exchange rate.  In contrast, this article has argued that 
remittances mitigate the costs of forgone domestic monetary policy autonomy and 
therefore increase the probability of choosing to fix the exchange rate. An analysis of 
data for 74 developing countries from 1983 to 2004 supports this argument.  As noted 
earlier, the newly available data on remittances from the World Bank have many 
drawbacks, most notably the fact that they only account for recorded flows. One should 
therefore assume that the empirical tests in this article are tentative, pending the 
availability of more accurate and comprehensive data on remittances.  
The introductory section of this article alluded to the many policy areas in which 
remittances could have an important influence.  For example, remittances could substitute 
for welfare-state spending by lessening the need for governmental subsidization of health   27
care or government-sponsored employment programs. Governments that would otherwise 
feel compelled to insulate their citizens from the forces of the global economy—for 
example, by increasing the size of the government in line with Rodrik (1998) and Garrett 
(1998)—might scale back their spending priorities in response to remittance inflows. In 
addition, to the extent that remittances help to stave off balance-of-payments difficulties, 
developing countries with substantial remittance inflows might be less likely to engage 
the services of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  These speculations 
should form the basis for future research.  
As a final note, this article contributes to a small but growing literature that seeks 
to unpack the components of financial globalization and gauge their varying (and often 
contradictory) impacts on economic policymaking. The literature contains several careful 
studies that isolate the political and institutional determinants of specific types of capital 
flows, including foreign direct investment (e.g., Jensen 2003, 2006; Li and Resnick 
2003), sovereign bonds (e.g., Mosley 2000, 2003; Sobel 1999), foreign exchange 
(Bernhard and Leblang 2002b; Freeman et al 2000; Moore and Mukherjee 2006), and 
equity investment (e.g., Bernhard and Leblang 2006).  The disparate findings in these 
studies should encourage future scholarship to avoid generalizations about the impact of 
global finance on economic policymaking. The popular metaphor of global finance as a 
“golden straitjacket” (Friedman 2000) might be more appropriately revised as a tug of 
war with various capital flows pulling policymakers in different directions.  
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Table 1: Summary Data 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Exchange Rate Regime  2.243  0.862  1  4 
Remittances (%GDP)  4.640  10.073  0  90.421 
GDP  (log)  23.603 1.849  19.177 28.131 
GDP  per  capita  (log)  7.085 1.012 5.022 9.897 
Trade Openness   67.407  39.460  5.314  280.36 
Capital Account Openness  -0.070  1.382  -1.752  2.623 
Reserves  4.217 3.477 0.167 27.083 
Terms of Trade Volatility  6.704  7.886  0  71.522 
Polity  2.460 6.699 -10  10 
Political  Crisis  0.010 0.050 0  0.40 
Political  Constraints  0.338 0.214 0  0.691 
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Table 2: Ordered Probit Results 
 
Dep. variable: Exchange Rate Regime 
(1=fixed; 4=floating) 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Remittances/GDP (lagged)  -0.037***     -0.068*** -0.057* 
  (0.014)      (0.020) (0.030) 
GDP (log)  0.168***     -0.074 -0.115 
  (0.060)  (0.078) (0.103) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.223**     -0.073 0.190 
  (0.099)     (0.156) (0.195) 
Trade Openness (lagged)    -0.006** -0.009 
    (0.003) (0.005) 
Capital Account Openness (KAOPEN)   -0.148** -0.226** 
    (0.066) (0.102) 
Reserves (in months of exports)    -0.036** -0.027 
    (0.018) (0.052) 
Terms of Trade Volatility    0.012 0.006 
    (0.008) (0.014) 
Polity    0.039*** 0.050** 
    (0.015) (0.025) 
Political Crisis     -0.023 
     (3.566) 
Political Constraints     -1.059 
     (0.744) 
Cut 1  1.595     -3.817 -3.088 
  (1.097)          (1.513) (2.226) 
Cut 2  2.603     -2.525 -1.983 
  (1.108)          (1.519) (2.226) 
Cut 3  3.959     -1.151 -0.188 
  (1.125)          (1.545) (2.286) 
Observations  1618  802 401 
Countries  99  74 36 
Pseudo R-squared  0.070  0.120 0.148 
Prob > chi-squared  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Note: Ordered probit coefficients; standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses.  
*p<=.10; **p<=.05; ***p<=.01. 
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Table 3: Logit and Instrumental Variable Probit Results 
 
Dep. variable: Exchange Rate Regime 
(0=fixed; 1=floating) 
 
 
Model 4 
(fixed effects 
logit) 
Model 5 
(IV Probit) 
 
 
Remittances/GDP (lagged)  -0.165**  -0.100***    
  (0.071)      (0.038) 
GDP (log)  4.047**  -0.173*** 
  (1.813)  (0.049) 
GDP per capita (log)  -9.314***  -0.163** 
  (2.352)  (0.075) 
Trade Openness (lagged)  0.006  -0.003 
  (0.008)  (0.004) 
Capital Account Openness (KAOPEN)  -0.117  -0.097**   
  (0.184)      (0.040) 
Reserves (in months of exports)  -0.238**     -0.010    
  (0.105)      (0.015)     
Terms of Trade Volatility  0.006     0.002    
  (0.028)       (0.008)      
Polity  0.646***     0.035**    
  (0.107)       (0.016)      
Observations  383  802 
Countries  24  74 
Log Likelihood  -104.578  -3311.422 
Prob > chi-squared  0.000  0.000 
Note: Model 4 presents conditional logit coefficients (country fixed effects); Model 5 presents the second-
stage results of an instrumental probit model (see text for discussion). Standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<=.10; **p<=.05; ***p<=.01. 
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Figure 1: Capital Inflows, by Type, to Developing Countries (1990-2004) 
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Source: World Bank (2006)   39
Figure 2a: Top 20 Recipients of Remittances, 2004 
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Figure 2b: Top 20 Recipients of Remittances as Percentage of GDP, 2004 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Tonga
Moldova
Lesotho
Haiti
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Jordan
Jamaica
Serbia and Montenegro
El Salvador
Honduras
Philippines
Domanican Rep.
Lebanon
Samoa
Tajikistan
Nicaragua
Albania
Nepal 
Kiribati
Yemen
%
G
D
P
  
Source: World Bank (2006)   40
 Figure 3:  
Predicted Probability of Fixing the Exchange Rate by Level of Remittances 
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Note: Results based on Model 1. All other variables held at their means. Dotted lines represent 95 percent 
confidence intervals. Simulations conducted using CLARIFY (Tomz et al 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 